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1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have a broad range of applications that can be
employed to a wide variety of scenarios, from the most simple to extremely complex
ones [Borges et al. 2014]. In critical applications such as medical emergency detec-
tion [Ko et al. 2010], volcano monitoring [Werner-Allen et al. 2006], and forest fire
detection [Hartung et al. 2006], to cite a few, it is easy to argue that security is of ut-
most importance. A compromised node can disrupt the network operation or make it
report false information with potentially disastrous consequences. Therefore, one must
be able to decide whether or not to trust the data reported by such sensors. Neverthe-
less, even in less critical applications, such as sensor-based information appliances
used in smart homes [Petriu et al. 2000], where the data monitored by sensors is not
of much significance, the security, and, in particular, the integrity of sensor nodes is
still important. An attacker can potentially use a compromised node not only to com-
promise other sensors but also as an entry point to undermine the system to which the
sensor network reports its data.
Most of the related work on the security of WSNs focuses on securing its underly-
ing protocols [Zhou et al. 2008] or on the trust and reputation management [Lopez
et al. 2010] in the network. However, by exploiting existing software vulnerabilities,
an adversary can easily compromise high reputation nodes without breaking their pro-
tocols. As observed by [Gu and Noorani 2008], vulnerabilities arising from low-level
memory faults, such as the infamous stack overflow [One 1996], and more recent, so-
phisticated, exploit techniques, such as return-oriented programming (ROP) [Shacham
Author’s addresses: Department of Computing, Imperial College London, South Kensington Campus, 180,
Queen’s Gate, London, SW7 2AZ, U.K; emails: {r.v.steiner, e.c.lupu}@imperial.ac.uk.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted
without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that
copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this
work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s).
c© YYYY Copyright held by the owner/author(s). 0360-0300/YYYY/01-ARTA $15.00
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/0000000.0000000
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:2 R. V. Steiner and E. Lupu
2007; Buchanan et al. 2008], pose a real threat to WSNs. In fact, these vulnerabili-
ties have already been exploited in the form of code injection attacks [Francillon and
Castelluccia 2008] and self-propagating mal-packets [Gu and Noorani 2008]. Thus, a
mechanism to attest the integrity of sensor nodes is necessary. The integrity of a node
is a binary property that indicates whether it has been modified in an unauthorized
manner or not [Sailer et al. 2004]. Compromised nodes cannot be trusted as they may
malfunction or present malicious behavior.
WSNs can comprise hundreds or thousands of sensor nodes that are distributed
in the environment. In many cases, nodes are deployed in an unsystematic fashion
making it difficult to know their location. While it is not practical for most application
scenarios, for some of them it is not even possible to physically reach and verify the
integrity of each node composing the network. Thus, there is a need for a mechanism
that not only verifies the integrity of the nodes but a mechanism that can do this
verification remotely, without physical access to the device being verified.
Many challenges arise under these circumstances. How to scale the verification for
the high number of devices. The heterogeneous hardware and software architecture
of such devices. The limited amount of energy they have available. The intrinsically
unreliable wireless medium in which they communicate. Nevertheless, several attes-
tation mechanisms have been proposed over the last years [Spinellis 2000; Seshadri
et al. 2004; Kil et al. 2009]. However, existing approaches make different assumptions
over the system and adversary models. Consequently, it is difficult to compare them
and analyse the security properties provided by these schemes. Moreover, this lack of
coherence has already resulted in new proposals [Jin et al. 2010; Vetter and Westhoff
2012; Kiyomoto and Miyake 2014; Tan et al. 2015; Yang et al. 2015; Asokan et al.
2015; Ibrahim et al. 2016] being vulnerable to formerly known attacks [Castelluccia
et al. 2009].
The variety of assumptions made, the plethora of techniques proposed, and a num-
ber of controversies encountered in the literature are the motivation for this survey.
In this paper, we extensively analyse the state of the art of attestation mechanisms in
the context of WSNs. We start in Section 2 by giving an overview of attestation, fol-
lowed by a comprehensive analysis of the system and adversary models. We then cover
common attacks and assumptions made, and their relevance in the context of WSNs.
In Section 3 we introduce a taxonomy that captures the fundamental differences be-
tween existing solutions. Each distinguishing characteristic used in our taxonomy is
illustrated with a representative example taken from the state of the art, which allow
us to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of existing approaches. Following
this analysis, we discuss open research problems and give directions on how to tackle
them in Section 4. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
2. ATTESTATION
A typical attestation mechanism follows a challenge-response protocol, as shown in
Figure 1. A trusted device verifies the integrity of an untrusted device which has to
prove its innocence. The devices are commonly named after their roles: Verifier and
Prover, respectively. The goal of the attestation procedure is to allow an honest, non-
compromised, Prover to generate a response that assures the Verifier that the prover is
in a legitimate state [Francillon et al. 2014]. A compromised Prover will either generate
invalid responses or will not be able to generate a valid response within an expected
time limit.
It is generally assumed that the Verifier knows, in advance, the correct internal
state — the memory contents — of the Prover. Therefore, the Verifier challenges the
Prover to demonstrate that it is in a valid, expected, state. The Prover then executes
an attestation routine, which will compute and send back a response based on the
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Fig. 1. Attestation overview.
challenge received from the verifier and its internal state. The Verifier compares the
answer received from the prover with the expected one, and if there is a match then it
can assert that the device has not been compromised. However, the Verifier only awaits
the prover’s response for a limited amount of time TA, which must be at least as long
as the time taken by the Prover to execute the genuine attestation routine. If the time
difference between receiving the response and issuing the challenge, TR − TC , exceeds
TA, the Verifier knows something may be wrong with the Prover. Note here, that when
performing attestation over a network, the time delay to send and receive messages
must also be taken into account. As we will discuss further in Section 3, there are two
different approaches regarding timing control: strict and loose.
We are not the first to analyse the attestation process. Nonetheless, existing analyses
are built under different assumptions. For example, [Datta et al. 2009], [Coker et al.
2011] and [Francillon et al. 2014] assume that the verifier and the prover need to
share some secret information, e.g., a cryptographic key. They presume that this secret
is defined prior to network deployment and that there exists some hardware support
preventing the adversary from accessing it. Their models, however, also do not consider
timing requirements. On the other hand, [Armknecht et al. 2013] and [Li et al. 2014]
focus on software-based attestation techniques that assume no hardware support and
are only concerned with attesting the program’s memory. The analysis in [Li et al.
2014] also covers approaches that completely erase the prover’s data memory. However,
neither of them cover proposals that attempt to verify the data memory instead of
simply wiping out its contents.
In this work we follow in the footsteps of existing analyses, however, we aim to pro-
vide a more comprehensive model capable of encompassing all approaches relevant for
WSNs, which allows us to evaluate the tradeoffs between different techniques. In this
context, the intrinsic characteristics of WSNs play an important role. The simplified
hardware and software architecture of sensor nodes has both a positive and negative
side. As a consequence of their reduced storage space, there is less memory available
for an adversary to explore. Furthermore, differently from general-purpose computers,
each node has a well-defined application to execute. Thus, it is easier to know what
are the expected memory contents of these devices. Moreover, sensor nodes are usually
equipped with single-core processors and have a single flow of execution, which reduces
the possibilities of an adversary to perform parallel operations during attestation. On
the downside, the limited amount of energy powering sensor nodes is certainly one of
the biggest restrictions imposed. The fact that the sensors may be placed in hostile en-
vironments and communicate over a wireless channel which may suffer from external
interference is another complicator.
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2.1. System Model
There are three entities that need to be considered when modeling an attestation
mechanism: the verifier V , the prover P , and the adversary A. Although attestation
mechanisms can be applied to other scenarios, we focus here only on WSNs. Therefore,
both the verifier and the prover are wireless sensor nodes. The verifier can possess
more computational power than common network nodes, but this is not mandatory.
Meanwhile, the adversary is either launching attacks remotely or using an already
compromised network node. Table I summarizes the notation adopted in this paper.
Table I. Notation Summary.
Term Description
A Adversary
c Challenge
M Memory
Me External memory
Mp Program memory
Md Data memory
Mmmio Memory Mapped Input/Output
Mr Registers
P Prover
r Response
S Internal state
TA Attestation time limit
TC Challenge sending time
TR Response reception time
V Verifier
A prover P has an internal state State(P ) = S that reflects the contents of its mem-
ory M . Ideally, all memory contents should be attested including the program memory
Mp, data memory Md, registers Mr, MMIO Mmmio, and even external memories Me.
However, each of the different attestation mechanisms covers different sections of the
memory, and in practice, some parts of M are left unverified. For instance, [Spinellis
2000] only checks Mp, while [Zhang and Liu 2010] partially validates Md and nothing
else. For simplicity, we consider (as reflected in the adopted notation) that the state S
of a prover P corresponds only to the portions of memory being attested.
One might think that the attestation is safer when a larger amount of memory is
being covered. However, this is not necessarily so. Usually, Mp is far greater than Md
but some attacks that only need to alter Md to succeed [Shacham 2007; Buchanan
et al. 2008]. Therefore, a safer approach would be to attest all different types of mem-
ory [Castelluccia et al. 2009]. However, even when all memories are covered, an adver-
sary can still perform several types of attacks. In practice, attestation only provides a
probabilistic guarantee of the integrity of a prover. In this work, we aim to identify the
factors that influence this probability.
An attestation process has three main constituents: CHALLENGE, ATTEST, and
VERIFY, which are present in all the approaches described in the literature although
their implementation may vary. Below we discuss each of them individually and
highlight the design principles that must be followed to provide secure attestation.
As stated before, we adopt much of previous analyses [Datta et al. 2009; Coker et al.
2011; Armknecht et al. 2013; Li et al. 2014; Francillon et al. 2014] while centering the
discussion around WSNs.
CHALLENGE() This procedure is executed by the verifier. It outputs a random chal-
lenge c that is transmitted to the prover and which may contain a nonce, a timestamp,
memory addresses, or even the attestation routine to be executed by P . CHALLENGE
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must follow three design principles: Authenticity, Freshness, and Unpredictability. The
first two principles are essential to prevent an adversary from performing Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attacks by unrestrictively forcing P to perform ATTEST. Nevertheless,
DoS attacks are not a major concern in attestation of sensor nodes as there are easier
methods to achieve the same effect such as channel jamming. The last principle pre-
vents the adversary from calculating the result of the attestation routine in advance
since ATTEST either takes as input or is itself, the unpredictable challenge generated.
Formally, this could be described as: there exists no efficient algorithm Alg such that,
for non-negligible ,
Pr[Alg()i = Challenge()i+1 : i ∈ N+] > .
ATTEST(S, c) The attestation routine is executed by the prover. It takes as input the
state S of P and the challenge c sent by V . When c is the attestation routine itself, it is
downloaded and installed in a pre-defined memory space in Mp. The goal of ATTEST is
to compute a small attestation response r, which must directly be based on both S and
c. This drastically reduces the amount of data transmitted from P to V as otherwise
the prover would have to transmit the entirety of its memory contents to the verifier
to prove its authenticity. ATTEST must adhere to five design principles. Authenticity
allows the verifier to confirm the source of r. Atomicity guarantees that ATTEST is not
interrupted during execution preventing the adversary from modifying S, moving the
malware around to avoid detection, or parallelizing the computation. Unforgeability
prevents an adversary from producing the same response r, at least not faster than
ATTEST. Dynamicity in the sense that r should reflect the actual running system, and
not just some static part of the memory. Finally, Determinism enables the verifier to
reach the same result r on its own. Formally:
Pr[∃ S 6= S˜ : Attest(S, c) = Attest(S˜, c)] ≤ 
VERIFY(S, c, r, TA, TC , TR) This function, executed by the verifier, takes as inputs
the expected state S of the prover, the challenge c that the verifier has generated, the
response r from P , the attestation time limit TA, the time when the challenge has been
sent TC and the response received TR. VERIFY must respect one design principle: De-
terminism so that it accepts iff r reflects both S and c and TR − TC ≤ TA. Furthermore,
VERIFY must always accept responses from uncompromised provers. Formally:
Pr[V erify(S, c, r, TA, TC , TR) = accept|State(P ) = S
∧ r = Attest(S, c)
∧ TR − TC ≤ TA] = 1
Having identified the main components, we can now formalize the interactions be-
tween the verifier and the prover. Figure 2 shows all steps described so far, which are
present in all existing approaches. In some approaches, however, these interactions
may slightly differ. For example, they can be preceded by an additional step where the
prover itself requests to be verified. [Park and Shin 2005] demands that each sensor
proves its integrity to a verification server before accessing the network, so new sen-
sors must ask to be attested before using network resources. [AbuHmed et al. 2009]
provides another example of variation of the interactions: to verify the freshness and
authenticity of a challenge request, a prover sends the challenge, encrypted together
with a random number, back to the verifier. The verifier then decrypts the message
and sends back to the prover the encrypted random number.
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V : c
R←− Challenge()
V → P : c
V : TC ← current time
P : r ← Attest(S, c)
P → V : r
V : TR ← current time
V : V erify(S, c, r, TA, TC , TR)
Fig. 2. Generic attestation procedure.
2.2. Adversary Model
The objective of an adversary is to compromise a sensor node without being detected by
the attestation procedure. We do not address techniques used to compromise nodes —
the interested reader may refer to [Francillon and Castelluccia 2008; Gu and Noorani
2008; Giannetsos and Dimitriou 2013] for additional information on this topic — but
rather cover the attacks an adversary may perform to overcome attestation. As ob-
served by [Armknecht et al. 2013], the adversary has two different phases to perform
an attack: an initial phase that occurs before the attestation begins, and a second one
that starts when the prover is challenged. Before attestation, the adversary can use
unlimited resources and may modify the state S of a prover at will, resulting in a new
state S˜. However, after being challenged the adversary has a limited amount of time
to send a response r˜.
2.2.1. Attacks.
A series of attacks are typically portrayed in the literature on how an adversary may
subdue the attestation process after having compromised a device. We describe each
of them individually below.
Precomputation. An adversary can precompute all operations of the attestation
routine that are not influenced by the challenge, thus gaining time that may be used
to execute other operations during the attestation. Furthermore, if the adversary
can predict the challenges generated by the verifier, it can then precompute valid
responses.
Replay. An adversary can eavesdrop a valid attestation response from a non-
compromised node, store it, and retransmit the message when challenged by the
verifier. Since the response reflects both the prover’s internal state and the challenge,
this approach can only work if both nodes execute the same program and receive the
same challenge.
Forgery. The adversary can attempt to generate a valid response despite modifi-
cations in the prover’s internal state. This can be achieved by executing a modified
version of the attestation routine or by altering memory contents in such a way that
modifications neutralize one another during response computation [Castelluccia et al.
2009].
Memory copy. If there is enough free space in memory, an adversary can store its
malicious data and still keep a copy of the original memory contents [Wurster et al.
2005]. Then, the adversary can modify the attestation routine so that it computes a
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response over the memory locations where the original contents copy is maintained.
Data substitution. This attack is a special case of the memory copy attack and occurs
when there is not enough space to keep a full copy of the original memory contents.
The adversary can then modify part of the original contents and keep a copy only of
the overwritten data [Seshadri et al. 2005]. In this case, the attestation routine must
be adjusted to redirect memory reads from altered memory addresses to the original
contents’ copy location.
Compression. In another special case of the memory copy attack an adversary
can compress the original contents to obtain enough space to store its malicious
data [Castelluccia et al. 2009]. During attestation, the adversary can then decompress
the original contents on-the-fly to compute the expected response.
Collusion. Compromised nodes can act together to compute valid responses. For
example, multiple nodes that execute the same application can install the malware
in different memory locations [Yang et al. 2007]. Then, during attestation, the nodes
can exchange messages to recover the original memory contents. Another possibility
is to divide the attestation routine operations across multiple devices to speed up the
computation of the response.
Impersonation. An adversary can take multiple identities and impersonate other
nodes (also known as Sybil attack [Newsome et al. 2004]). In doing so, it can masquer-
ade as a genuine node during attestation and send an invalid response, thus making
the verifier believe the original node has been compromised. Besides, a compromised
node may also impersonate the base station and forward the challenges it receives to
a genuine node and then forward the correct response back to the base station.
Proxy. This attack is a special instance of collusion and impersonation attacks
because it requires a device with better computing capabilities than the prover.
Whenever a compromised node is challenged, it forwards the challenge to this proxy
device. The proxy keeps a copy of the node’s original memory contents and is able
to impersonate it to compute a valid response. Since the proxy device has greater
computing resources, it can also compute the attestation routine faster than common
nodes.
Return-oriented programming. ROP attacks [Shacham 2007; Buchanan et al. 2008]
use existing code, without altering it, to execute malicious operations. An attacker can
perform arbitrarily complex malicious operations by linking together small sequences
of instructions, called gadgets, present in existing programs. Originally, each gadget
would end with a ret instruction, and the attacker could chain different gadgets
together by modifying the stack, making them execute one after another. It was shown
subsequently that these attacks can be performed without using return operations,
but also through other instructions that alter the program control flow, such as
branch, call, and jump [Checkoway et al. 2010]. Because gadgets are built from
original program instructions, ROP attacks can circumvent defenses that assume the
adversary must modify or insert new code [Buchanan et al. 2008].
It is interesting to see that the majority of attacks do not require the malicious node
to interact with other devices. Only the Replay, Collusion, Impersonation, and Proxy
attacks require such interaction.
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2.3. Assumptions
We present here the most common assumptions encountered in the literature and
examine existing exceptions and conflicts among them.
The verifier cannot be compromised by the attacker. In many cases, the verifier
is the network’s base station. Since the base station acts as a gateway connecting
the sensor network to the outside world, it is common to assume that it cannot
be compromised [Seshadri et al. 2006]. Nonetheless, not all approaches make this
assumption. For instance, [Yang et al. 2007] proposes a distributed attestation scheme
where all nodes in the network can play the role of the verifier. However, since all
nodes are vulnerable to compromises, the attestation process no longer rely on a single
verifier. Instead, multiple neighbors of a node collaborate to attest it. In this case,
the attestation result also depends on how many devices an attacker has compromised.
The verifier knows the expected state of the prover. To attest that a device has not
been compromised a verifier must know what to expect from such device. In most
approaches, the verifier has complete knowledge of the software that should be
running on the prover device [Kennell and Jamieson 2003]. With this knowledge, the
verifier can know the set of valid states a prover can be. A different strategy is to issue
each node with a certificate of its valid configuration [Asokan et al. 2015]. This allows
the verifier to attest a device without knowing its settings in detail.
The verifier knows the hardware architecture of the prover. The prover’s hardware
plays a major role in the construction of the attestation routine ATTEST. It defines
which operations must be performed by the prover to demonstrate its integrity. For
instance, ATTEST can take advantage of any tamper-resistant hardware available to
perform its operations and protect secret information. On the other hand, when no
such hardware is available the attestation routine has to be carefully designed. In
such scenarios, ATTEST is usually assumed to be optimal so that an adversary cannot
optimize it and execute further operations to hide its modifications and still reply
in a valid time. Therefore, the verifier must know the microcontroller, clock speed,
Instruction Set Architecture (ISA), and memory architecture of the prover [Seshadri
et al. 2004].
The adversary can reverse engineer the prover’s software and hardware. Commodity
sensor nodes [Hill et al. 2004; Hempstead et al. 2008; Healy et al. 2008] do not provide
any tamper-resistant hardware since such nodes are supposed to be cheap and small
in size. So the node’s software is usually stored in unprotected memory, which an
attacker can read, reverse engineer, and modify. Therefore, the attestation procedure
cannot rely on secret information such as cryptographic keys that would be stored in
unprotected memory. Needless to say, this assumption does not hold for mechanisms
developed targeting devices with tamper-resistant hardware.
The adversary has full control of the prover’s memory. In the absence of hardware
controls to protect the prover’s program memory, an adversary can modify the
underlying software at will. Consequently, the attacker can control the prover and
all its communications and can perform both passive and active attacks, such as
eavesdropping, packet injection, replay, selective forwarding, and many others. Some
mechanisms explore the use of tamper-resistant hardware, Read Only Memory (ROM),
or even a Memory Protection Unit (MPU) to limit the adversary control.
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The adversary cannot modify the prover’s hardware. It is generally assumed that an
attacker cannot perform any hardware modification to the sensor node, such as attach-
ing more memory, altering memory access timing, or even changing the processor clock
speed [Seshadri et al. 2004]. This assumption is usually justified in terms of the cost
and practicality of the attack. Not only would an attacker require physical access to
the sensor to modify its hardware but also the means and time to carry out the modifi-
cation on a significant subset of the sensors in the WSN. To remain consistent with this
assumption one must also consider that in such cases the attestation mechanism must
similarly not rely on physical access to validate the integrity of the node and must be
done remotely. Note that attestation works as a first line of defense, compelling the
adversary to either modify individual sensors or deploy new, already modified, sensors
in the network. As observed by [Park and Shin 2005], other techniques like intrusion
detection systems [da Silva et al. 2005; Roman et al. 2006; Sun et al. 2007] can be
deployed in conjunction with attestation to defend against such attacks.
3. TAXONOMY
Over the last years, several attestation mechanisms have been proposed. Neverthe-
less, as seen in Section 2, they make different, and sometimes conflicting, assump-
tions. Therefore, they use intrinsically different ways of achieving their goals. Cur-
rent literature most commonly separates attestation into two categories: hardware-
and software-based. However, we do not believe this classification is always helpful as
it hinders the comparison of existing approaches in terms of the security properties
achieved. There is more to the process of attestation than the use or not of tamper-
resistant hardware. In this Section, we review the main characteristics of existing
approaches and propose a new taxonomy to classify the different techniques proposed.
This allows us to compare their advantages, disadvantages, and vulnerabilities. Our
proposed taxonomy, shown in Figure 3, identifies eight major characteristics of attes-
tation mechanisms, each of which can be realized in different ways. We discuss them
in more detail below.
Fig. 3. A taxonomy of attestation mechanisms.
3.1. Evidence Acquisition
Arguably, the biggest issue in attestation is the manner in which the verifier draws
evidence of the prover’s integrity and the extent to which this evidence can be trusted.
Three main different approaches can be identified in the literature: hardware-based,
software-based, and hybrid techniques.
Hardware-based techniques rely on tamper-resistant hardware such as the Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) [TCG 2011] or Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [Pappu
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et al. 2002; Gassend et al. 2002]. For example, [Tan et al. 2015] describes a TPM-
enabled Remote Attestation Protocol (TRAP) for WSNs in which all sensor nodes are
equipped with TPMs responsible for securing preloaded secrets. Prior to the network
deployment, each node is preloaded with cryptographic keys to safely communicate
with neighboring nodes and the base station. When a node is powered on, it transfers
control to its bootloader, which, differently from the application, cannot have its code
updated after node deployment. Therefore, the bootloader code is used as a first line of
defense. During the initialization phase, each node computes a hash of the bootloader
code, stores it into a TPM Platform Configuration Register (PCR) and uses it to seal
the cryptographic keys into the TPM. When the bootloader is running, it computes and
stores a hash of its own code. Consequently, if the bootloader code has been altered,
the TPM unseal command will fail, and the node will be unable to generate a valid
attestation response. The bootloader also computes and stores a hash of the applica-
tion code into the TPM. During attestation, the verifier, which can be any neighbor of
the prover, uses the TPM to generate a random number and encrypts it using the key
shared with the prover. It then sends the challenge to the prover and asks the base
station for the value of the prover’s hash code and its public key. Upon receiving the
challenge, the prover has to decrypt it, pass it as a nonce to the TPM, and construct
a response based on the TPM output. This response can only be correct if the applica-
tion code has not been altered. However, this approach only verifies the prover’s Mp.
Therefore, it is vulnerable to ROP attacks, which only need to alter the call stack to
succeed.
Software-based techniques do not rely on secure hardware. Instead, the prover exe-
cutes an attestation routine that produces an allegedly unforgeable result. [Spinellis
2000] is one of the earliest works on software-based attestation. The author proposes
the use of reflection to perform software integrity verification, and although the pro-
posed approach is not specifically designed for WSNs, its computational performance
remains within the practical limits of WSN nodes. In this approach, the verifier ran-
domly chooses two overlapping memory regions of the prover’sMp, such that one region
covers the initial memory addresses and the other covers the last addresses, and they
overlap somewhere in-between. The prover then computes a cryptographic hash for
each region. The verifier similarly calculates the corresponding hash values, from its
own copy of the memory being attested, and compares them with the values received.
Because the hash values cover the entire Mp any modification to it will be detected.
This, however, is based on the assumption that the attacker cannot interrupt the veri-
fication process and move the malware around, always relocating it to somewhere out
of the current hash computation range. Moreover, as the hash computations are inde-
pendent of one another, colliding nodes could compute them separately and in parallel
to avoid detection by timing differences. Spinellis also describes an extension of this
procedure where the prover also sends data regarding its processor state, such as the
CPU cache or performance counter. However, as this information is not used in the
hash computation, once an adversary eavesdrops a valid response, it could simply ex-
tract this part and replay it.
We classify as hybrid techniques, approaches that do not depend on a tamper-
resistant hardware but do require specific hardware, such as ROM, to achieve attesta-
tion. For example, [Perito and Tsudik 2010] presents a secure code update mechanism
for embedded devices based on Proofs of Secure Erasure (PoSE). This procedure re-
quires a small amount of ROM to store the attestation routine and thus prevents an
adversary from modifying it. The verifier sends incompressible random noise large
enough to completely fill the prover’s writable memories. The prover, uses the code
stored in ROM, to compute a Message Authentication Code (MAC) over all data re-
ceived, using the last bits as the key, and sends it back to the verifier, which checks
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it. This procedure is also particularly targeted at secure code updates as the “incom-
pressible random noise” can be an encrypted form of the new code for the node. Once
the verifier has verified the MAC, it can then send to the prover the key used for en-
cryption, which the prover uses to decrypt the code and perform the code update. The
main disadvantage of this approach is the high communication overhead it introduces.
The need to transmit enough data to completely fill the prover’s writable memories
consumes significant amounts of time and energy. Furthermore, there is an implicit
assumption that nodes under attestation cannot collude.
3.1.1. Discussion.
Tamper-resistant hardware works as a root of trust, and all the information and ser-
vices it provides are considered to be reliable thus facilitating the attestation pro-
cedure. However, a major drawback of hardware-based techniques is that they can-
not be used on legacy devices that do not have such hardware. Furthermore, using
tamper-resistant hardware increases both sensor cost and energy consumption mak-
ing it inappropriate in a number of scenarios. The assumption that tamper-resistant
hardware is sufficient to engender trust is also increasingly threatened as numerous
types of attacks can still be explored by an adversary [Anderson and Kuhn 1996].
Side-channel attacks such as timing [Kocher 1996], power [Kocher et al. 1999], and
electromagnetic analysis [Gandolfi et al. 2001] are some examples. More recently, both
TPMs [Kursawe et al. 2005; Kauer 2007; Sparks 2007; Parno 2008; Winter and Diet-
rich 2013] and PUFs [Ru¨hrmair et al. 2010; Merli et al. 2011; Helfmeier et al. 2013]
have been the target of attacks. In contrast, software-based techniques do not rely
on tamper-resistant hardware. The benefits of these approaches are that they can be
applied to legacy devices and do not increase the node’s cost and size. Therefore, it
is unsurprising that the majority of attestation mechanisms proposed for WSNs are
software-based. Hybrid approaches share advantages and disadvantages of hardware-
and software-based techniques. For example, writing the attestation routine in ROM
guarantees that it will not be modified by an attacker. However, it is dependent on hav-
ing a sufficient amount of space available in the ROM, and this may not be the case
with legacy devices. Furthermore, since physical attacks are difficult and costly, the
use of tamper-resistant hardware might be considered overkill. For instance, a MPU
can be used instead, to prevent illegitimate accesses to secrets [Eldefrawy et al. 2012;
Koeberl et al. 2014].
There is much discussion on the feasibility of remote attestation using solely
software-based techniques. Before these schemes started being applied to WSNs —
which theoretically facilitates their implementation, as sensor nodes have a much sim-
pler architecture — [Kennell and Jamieson 2003] proposed to use CPU execution side
effects, such as translation lookaside buffer (TLB) misses, into a genuine test. The via-
bility and reliability of using such side effects were then significantly debated [Shankar
et al. 2004a; Kennell and Jamieson 2004; Shankar et al. 2004b]. [Castelluccia et al.
2009] investigates the shortcomings of existing approaches to embedded devices and
presents two generic attacks, which have since been refuted [Perrig and Van Doorn
2010] and then reasserted [Francillon et al. 2010]. They argue that it is very diffi-
cult to correctly design attestation schemes with strict timing conditions because their
implementation must be highly optimized. They also claim that, contrary to some ex-
isting schemes, all memories of the prover must be attested and that doing so is quite
challenging. [Francillon et al. 2014] asserts that software-based techniques can be se-
cure only if the prover and verifier communicate directly with no intermediate nodes,
and thus cannot be used to perform attestation across a network. However, [Yang et al.
2015] presents a delay-resilient software-based attestation mechanism capable of per-
forming multi-hop attestation named Low-cost Remote Memory Attestation (LRMA).
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LRMA demands the response packet to go through the same path taken by the chal-
lenge. Relay nodes record the time when they receive each packet and report it to the
verifier which can then estimate the average single-hop delay and detect compromised
nodes by using a Bayesian classifier. Moreover, if the network is using a Time Division
Multiple Access (TDMA) based Medium Access Control (MAC) [van Hoesel et al. 2004]
then the network delay is known. Furthermore, it is also possible to attest all network
nodes without using multi-hop attestation. For example, [Seshadri et al. 2006] pro-
poses an expanding ring method, on which the base station starts by attesting nodes
one hop away from it and then asks these nodes to attest their neighbours. The verifi-
cation then proceeds in a hop-by-hop manner resembling an expanding ring. Another
alternative is presented in [Yang et al. 2007] where the authors propose a many-to-one
attestation in which the prover’s neighbors execute the verification procedure avoiding
the need for multi-hop attestation.
3.2. Integrity Measurement
The internal state of a prover can comprehend its program memory, data memory,
registers, MMIO, and even external memories. Memories can be further divided into
a static part whose contents never change during normal software execution, and a
dynamic part whose contents may be inserted, removed or modified.
Static integrity measurement approaches verify only the static part of a prover’s
memory. For example, in the lightweight attestation scheme for WSNs presented in
[Kiyomoto and Miyake 2014] all nodes have their memory divided into two parts: a
program area MP for storing program code and data, and another area MA for attes-
tation. Both MP and MA are divided in what the authors named registers (but without
discussing the size of a register — it thus could be a single memory address or a block
of addresses). If the program code is not large enough to fill MP further random data is
used in order to fill it. During the initialization phase, a sensor node randomly selects
a register from one of its neighbors, computes a hash value for it, and stores the re-
sult in MA. The node then repeats this process, randomly selecting different registers
from different neighbors until it fills MA. During attestation, a node randomly chooses
a register either from MP or MA. If it selects a register from MP , then the node gets
the corresponding MA register stored in one of its neighbors. Otherwise, if it selects
a register from MA, then it gets the corresponding MP register stored in one of its
neighbors. In both cases, the hash is recalculated from the MP register, and the result
is compared with the MA register. If the values do not match, one or both nodes have
been compromised. However, there is no way to find out which node has been compro-
mised and, therefore, both nodes must terminate their operation. A terminated node
stops communicating with the network to avoid the propagation of malicious code. It
is, however, possible for an adversary that successfully compromises a node to modify
the code in such a way that it never terminates, even if it does not pass attestation.
Furthermore, the attestation verifies only one register at a time, so it has poor mem-
ory coverage and, for example, an adversary that modifies only one register has a good
chance of remaining undetected.
Dynamic integrity measurement approaches check run-time properties of the soft-
ware executing on the prover where such properties represent the behavior that must
be satisfied during the normal execution of a program. For instance, the stack frames
are arranged as a linked list, where the base pointer of a frame points to the base
pointer of the previous frame. Remote Dynamic Attestation System (ReDAS) [Kil et al.
2009] is an example of such an approach. It automatically extracts the properties from
each application’s source code and binary in an offline phase. Then, during the pro-
gram execution, any integrity violation evidence is recorded. To prevent an adversary
from modifying the recorded evidence, every prover is equipped with a TPM. Therefore,
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when a violation is detected it is immediately sealed into the TPM. Then, when chal-
lenged by a verifier, all the prover has to do is send the sealed information. However,
ReDAS only checks a subset of all possible dynamic system properties and measures
the system integrity only at system calls. Therefore, an adversary can still succeed if
it only changes properties not covered by ReDAS, or if it hides modifications between
system calls.
3.2.1. Discussion.
To check if a device has been compromised, the verifier must know in advance the set
of valid states for the device. Since contents in static memory regions do not change
during normal software execution, they provide a straightforward way to attest a de-
vice. The verifier challenges the prover to calculate a checksum over these memory
regions and come up with a valid response, which turns out to be difficult to achieve
unless these memory regions have not been modified. Difficult, but not impossible. As
we have seen, there are numerous methods an adversary may use to circumvent at-
testation, e.g., forgery, memory copy, and collusion attacks. If the attestation process
is not carefully implemented under realistic assumptions, the adversary may succeed.
Therefore, even if a device comes up with a valid response, it does not mean that it
has not been compromised. Static integrity measurement approaches are eminently
vulnerable to ROP attacks since these attacks use the already existing code without
altering it. Just as important as verifying that the code residing in static memory
regions has not been modified, is to verify that the code is being executed as it was
mentioned to be. This is the aim of dynamic integrity measurement approaches. How-
ever, due to the diversity and dynamicity of run-time properties, it is not an easy task
to identify the known good states of dynamic objects [Kil et al. 2009].
3.3. Timing
In any practical implementation of an attestation mechanism, the verifier will only
wait for a limited amount of time for a prover’s response after sending a challenge.
While some proposals have a strict timing condition, others adopt a more loose ap-
proach.
SoftWare-based ATTestation (SWATT) [Seshadri et al. 2004] is the first attestation
mechanism designed specifically for embedded devices. It relies on strict timing of
challenge/responses to detect compromised provers. The verifier sends the prover a
randomly generated nonce that is used as the seed to the prover’s Pseudo-Random
Number Generator (PRNG). The prover then performs a cell-based pseudo-random
memory traversal, iteratively reading memory words and computing a checksum of its
program memory contents. Therefore, an adversary cannot predict the order of mem-
ory accesses, and if the memory has been altered, the attacker has to modify the attes-
tation routine and insert statements checking whether the current address was modi-
fied. If that is the case, then, to get the right response, the adversary has to redirect the
memory access to the memory location where the original value is. The authors’ main
assumption is that the attestation routine is constructed in a time-optimal way so that
any modifications to it would result in a detectable increase in computation time which
the verifier would detect. So, the verifier detects compromised provers either because
the returned checksum is wrong, or because the response is delayed. [Castelluccia et al.
2009] however presents an attack that is faster than the one the authors of SWATT
considered. Furthermore, another possibility is to overclock the prover’s CPU, such
that, even if more instructions have to be executed, the total amount of time taken
would still be within the limits. Although, this would be considered a hardware mod-
ification attack, and thus, assumed not to occur. Partly to address this, [Kong et al.
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2014] proposed to incorporate the outputs of a PUF into the checksum computation to
overcome overclocking, as well as impersonation attacks.
[Choi et al. 2007] proposes a proactive code verification protocol for WSNs with loose
timing conditions. In essence, the main idea is to fill the prover’s memory so that an
adversary has no place to hide its malicious code. The base station adopts the role
of the verifier and is assumed to share a pairwise key with every node in the net-
work. The prover receives a nonce from the base station and uses it as the seed to a
Pseudo-random Function (PRF) whose outputs are used to fill empty memory regions.
Afterwards, the prover calculates a hash over its memory and sends the result to the
base station for verification. The issue with this approach is that the random contents
used to fill the memory are being generated by a PRF executing on the prover. So once
a node is compromised, the attacker has access to the PRF and can use it to calcu-
late the hash on-the-fly, without ever storing its outputs in memory. Even if this takes
more time than the normal protocol execution, the proposed scheme does not strictly
control the execution time of the attestation routine, and the attack would pass unde-
tected. A second issue is again, the use of cryptographic keys with no tamper-resistant
hardware.
3.3.1. Discussion.
Theoretically, the larger the time limit for a prover to respond to a challenge, the higher
the number of attacks an adversary can explore. Whether an approach relies on accu-
rate measurements of the attestation routine execution time depends on the system
model and the assumptions made.
Approaches with strict timing conditions do not rely on tamper-resistant hardware
and assume a time-optimal implementation of the attestation routine. Otherwise, an
adversary could develop a faster routine and use the time saved to forge a valid result.
However, the work in [Castelluccia et al. 2009] highlights a number of limitations of
these approaches. Firstly, it is very difficult to correctly design a time-optimal attes-
tation routine since its implementation must be small and simple. This precludes the
use of cryptographic functions, which are complex and time consuming, and favors the
use of simple instructions, such as add and xor, which may achieve poor security. Sec-
ondly, to achieve maximum speed, these routines are implemented in assembly, which
is highly error-prone. Thirdly, proving the run-time optimality, for both the attestation
routine and best possible attack, remains an open research problem. Another issue
with these approaches is that, in most scenarios, they cannot be used for multi-hop
attestation, since the network latency may be unpredictable. On the other hand, ap-
proaches that do not depend on accurate measurements of the execution time either
rely on tamper-resistant hardware or make assumptions that limit the adversary ca-
pabilities. One of the assumptions made is that if all memories of the prover are filled,
then an adversary has no space to allocate malware and still manage to compute a
valid response. However, these assumptions do not always hold. For example, an ad-
versary might compress the existing code in memory gaining enough space for the
malware, or colluding nodes might install the malware in different memory locations,
such that when they communicate they can recover the contents that were locally over-
written.
3.4. Memory Traversal
During attestation, a prover uses its memory contents as evidence of its trustworthi-
ness. The prover has essentially two different ways to traverse its memory: sequen-
tially or pseudo-randomly where the later can be further classified into cell-based or
block-based.
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Sequential memory traversal approaches go through a prover’s memory in an it-
erative manner from start to end. For example, [Park and Shin 2005] presents
a soft tamper-proofing scheme for WSNs based on Program Integrity Verifica-
tion (PIV). The network is divided into clusters, operated by cluster heads, named PIV
Servers (PIVSs), which have better computation and storage capabilities than normal
sensors. PIVSs work as verifiers and for each attestation round they generate a differ-
ent attestation routine, PIV Code (PIVC), which is executed by the prover. By using
Randomized Hash Functions (RHFs), PIVSs randomly encode hash computation al-
gorithms for each PIVC created. To protect sensors from adversaries impersonating
PIVSs, there are multiple Authentication Servers (AS) deployed over the network. An
AS works as a Trusted Third Party (TTP) allowing sensor nodes to confirm the au-
thenticity of PIVSs and, consequently, the PIVC. The authors do not discuss the AS
in further details stating they can either share a symmetric key with nodes or use
public-key cryptography; though again the nodes are not assumed and are not likely
to possess tamper-resistant hardware to secure cryptographic keys. Prior to deploy-
ment, a nodes’ program memory is partitioned into multiple blocks. For each block,
a digest is calculated and stored in a database accessible by all PIVSs. The digests
are then classified into three categories: common to all nodes, common to a group of
nodes, or unique to a specific node. Therefore, the number of digests to be stored can be
greatly reduced. Before gaining access to the network, a node must prove its integrity.
Thus, during the initialization phase all nodes ask to be verified. The RHF generates
the same result if it takes either the program block or its corresponding digest as in-
put. Consequently, both the prover and the PIVS are able to obtain the same result.
Starting from the first address of the program memory towards the last, a checksum
is computed for each memory block and a final checksum over these checksums rep-
resents the entire memory. The authors propose to initialize the data memory with
random values that can neither be predicted nor compressed. However, an adversary
could still compress the original software, residing at Mp, and calculate the digest for
the compressed code blocks using on-the-fly decompression techniques.
Secure Code Update By Attestation (SCUBA) [Seshadri et al. 2006] is a mechanism
for the detection and recovery of compromised nodes in WSNs. It relies on Indisputable
Code Execution (ICE), which guarantees untampered code execution regardless of
whether the node has been compromised or not. The approach requires each sensor
node to have enough space in ROM to store its own ID and the base station’s public
key. Therefore, an adversary cannot modify these values even after it compromises a
node. The approach is similar to SWATT, however, it does not verify the entire program
memory, and it extends the checksum computation to include dynamic data. Differ-
ently from Spinellis, ICE takes the CPU state — Program Counter (PC), Data Pointer
(DP), and Status Register (SR) — as input to calculate the checksum. To secure its un-
tampered execution, the attestation routine disables all interrupts. Then it computes a
checksum over the memory regions containing itself, the SCUBA protocol executable,
the node ID and base station’s public key, as well as the CPU state. It sends the result
to the base station and starts the SCUBA executable, with interrupts still disabled,
guaranteeing it executes untampered. As with SWATT, the attestation routine is con-
structed in such a way that the checksum will either be incorrect or its computation
will be notably longer if the routine is modified. In such cases, the base station can as-
sume the node has been compromised and blacklist it. Otherwise, the SCUBA protocol
can further verify the node, inspecting and repairing the rest of its memory. A down-
side of the proposed scheme is that the PC may not be accessible depending on the
platform. Furthermore, [Castelluccia et al. 2009] describes an attack that overcomes
ICE’s checksum computation and is able to execute arbitrary code without being de-
tected. The attack takes advantage of the fact that the additions performed by the
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ICE checksum function discard the carry. Therefore, changes in the most significant
bit (MSB) may not alter the checksum result. This allows an adversary to store a copy
of the ICE function in a different memory position, such that its address only differs
from the original location in its MSBs.
3.4.1. Discussion.
Sequential memory traversal approaches are simple to implement and efficient — they
run in linear time according to the memory size. Furthermore, they provide complete
coverage over the memory regions being verified, passing through each memory ad-
dress a single time. Nevertheless, these advantages come at the cost of a disadvan-
tage, which is predictability. The fact that memory addresses are checked only a single
time and in a predictable order makes it easier for adversaries to counterfeit attesta-
tion. For instance, an adversary can move memory contents around to avoid detection.
When verification starts, malware can be moved to the end of the memory and right
after the verification passes through its original position the malware can be moved
back. Another possibility is for two colluding nodes to install the malware in different
memory locations, and when one of them is under attestation, it asks the other for the
contents it has overwritten. In contrast, Pseudo-random approaches, are intrinsically
unpredictable, and not victims of the same attacks. However, they are less efficient and
provide only a probabilistic guarantee of memory coverage. To ensure, with high prob-
ability, that each memory address is accessed at least once, these schemes rely on the
result of the Coupon Collector’s Problem [Mitzenmacher and Upfal 2005], which states
that for a memory of size n it is necessary to perform O(n lnn) memory reads. Con-
sequently, some memory addresses end up being accessed multiple times introducing
unnecessary overhead. To reduce this overhead, [Yang et al. 2007] proposed to tra-
verse the memory in a block by block manner. Rather than accessing the memory one
address at a time, block-based approaches access blocks of addresses and perform xor
operations within blocks. For a block size b, O(n lnnb ) iterations are necessary to cover
each memory address at least once. It is interesting to see that when b = 1 the scheme
functions as cell-based approaches, and when b = n it works as a sequential traver-
sal. Choosing the size of b is, therefore, a tradeoff between performance and security.
Furthermore, as observed by [Armknecht et al. 2013], if the block size is determined
prior to attestation, an adversary can perform collision attacks against block-based
schemes. These are forgery attacks that work by altering addresses inside a block in
such a way that modifications neutralize one another.
3.5. Attestation Routine
Most existing approaches have their attestation routine embedded in the prover’s
memory prior to the network’s deployment. However, a verifier may also generate and
send the prover different routines for each attestation round.
For example, [Shaneck et al. 2005] proposes a remote software-based attestation
framework were the attestation routine is generated on-the-fly. The base station plays
the role of the verifier and is assumed to be within communication range of all network
nodes. Furthermore, it shares a symmetric key with each node to secure communica-
tion. At each attestation round the base station generates a new attestation routine
and sends it to the prover. It waits for a maximum time that comprises the time to
send and receive a message, the attestation routine execution time, and the expected
network delay. The procedure utilizes techniques such as randomization, encryption,
obfuscation, and self-modifying code to prevent an adversary from avoiding detection.
They propose to use random keys to encrypt the entire attestation routine and send
a corresponding decryption routine together with the code. This routine is also re-
sponsible for discovering the key, which is located somewhere in the prover’s memory,
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hidden through opaque predicates [Collberg et al. 1998]. The attestation routine has
three main components: seed calculation, memory reads, and hash computation. The
first component is responsible for initializing the PRNG, which determines the order
of memory accesses. So it is in the interest of an adversary not to modify this part, but
to infer the seed value. However, the seed computation also uses opaque predicates.
The other two components are part of a loop, that reads memory addresses and use
their contents to compute the hash. As with SWATT, it is necessary to iterate through
the loop several times to cover the program memory. The second component is the one
an adversary would attempt to modify so that it could redirect memory reads. To avoid
such modifications this component has several junk instructions, which appear to be
reachable due to opaque predicates, and it self-modifies its code relocating the read in-
struction at each iteration. After the hash calculation is complete, the result is sent to
the base station. The authors have neither implemented nor evaluated their proposal,
so it is difficult to discuss its security and even its feasibility. One difficulty to imple-
ment this proposal is that several commodity sensor nodes store the executable code in
flash memories programmable only by pages. Another issue is the use of cryptographic
keys to secure communication, which, once again, is made without considering that
commodity nodes do not have tamper-resistant hardware to protect them from attack-
ers.
3.5.1. Discussion.
Approaches that embed the attestation routine in the prover’s memory provide security
by design. The attestation routine is conceived to be secure, such that a prover will fail,
with high probability, to provide a valid response if either it changes the routine or the
memory contents under verification. On the other hand, approaches that generate the
attestation routine on-the-fly provide security through obscurity. Since a new routine
is generated for each attestation round, attackers cannot predict what instructions
should be executed and even less the outcome. The attestation routine may actually
have vulnerabilities, but since their implementation is hidden from opponents, these
vulnerabilities are unlikely to be explored in a timely manner.
3.6. Program Memory
It is possible that the program of a sensor node does not occupy its entire program
memory, thus leaving empty spaces. An adversary can, therefore, take advantage of
this space to store data used to overcome attestation. To avoid this, some approaches
propose to fill the empty space with incompressible random noise.
For example, [AbuHmed et al. 2009] introduces two software-based remote code at-
testation procedures for WSNs. The authors also consider a scenario where the base
station acts as verifier and shares cryptographic keys with sensor nodes without any
tamper-resistant hardware. In this context they present two techniques, one pre- and
one post-deployment, to fill the empty memory space of sensor nodes with incompress-
ible random noise. In the pre-deployment approach, the program memory of each node
is filled using a seed and the verifier keeps a register of the seed together with the
corresponding node ID. Then, during attestation time, the verifier can generate a copy
of the node’s memory to compute the checksum and compare the result with the one
received. In the post-deployment approach, a node uses some dynamic data gathered
from the environment as the seed to generate the noise and fill its memory. After that,
the sensor transmits the seed to the verifier and deletes it from its memory. Conse-
quently, an adversary who compromises the node afterwards has no space to store its
malicious code, and if it does overwrite the memory, it cannot regenerate the original
contents without the seed. The authors also propose two block-based memory traversal
algorithms with variable block sizes, in contrast to [Yang et al. 2007] where the size
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is always the same. In the first algorithm, the verifier defines the size of the block to-
gether with the challenge. In the second algorithm, a dynamic block size that changes
during the checksum computation is used. However, both schemes are still vulnerable
to compression attacks, as an adversary can compress the original software and cal-
culate the digest for the compressed code blocks using on-the-fly decompression tech-
niques.
3.6.1. Discussion.
Physical memory contents are typically of low entropy and thus compressible [Douglis
1993]. As a result, even if empty spaces are filled with incompressible random noise it
may still be possible for an attacker to compress the original program code and gain
enough space for its malicious code [Castelluccia et al. 2009]. To defend against this
attack, [Vetter and Westhoff 2012] presents a code attestation mechanism with com-
pressed instruction code. Each sensor node is uploaded with a compressed code image,
and its remaining program memory is filled with incompressible random noise. The
code image is divided into blocks of equal length which are individually compressed.
However, after compression these blocks may not have the same size. Therefore, the
program memory is divided into two sections, one to store the compressed code blocks
and another one, named Line Address Table (LAT), to store the block’s offsets. In order
to execute the compressed code, they incorporate a hardware extension: a dedicated mi-
crocontroller uses the LAT section to decompress code blocks, and a cache, maintained
within the node’s RAM, is used to store the decompressed code block under execution.
They implemented the same attestation routine used by SWATT [Seshadri et al. 2004],
however, they do not have the same strict timing conditions since the memory is com-
pletely full. Nonetheless, the data memory is not verified, and an attacker can perform
ROP attacks or even modify the decompressed code held in the cache to compromise a
node. Besides, the need for a dedicated microcontroller to decompress code blocks is a
strong limiting factor for the applicability of this scheme.
3.7. Data Memory
Depending on the prover’s memory architecture, the data and program memory physi-
cal addresses can either be shared with (von Neumann architecture) or separated from
(Harvard architecture) one another. In the latter case, it is common for the size of the
program memory to be much bigger than the data memory. Therefore, an attacker ex-
ploring the data memory has only a limited amount of space [Shaneck et al. 2005].
Also, in the Harvard architecture, the contents of the data memory are not executable.
For these reasons, some approaches do not verify the data memory. However, attacks
exploring the data memory have already been demonstrated. For example, the work in
[Castelluccia et al. 2009] describes a rootkit-based attack that hides malicious code in
the data memory during attestation.
Some dynamic attestation mechanisms try to verify the data memory. For example
Dataguard [Zhang and Liu 2010] is a software attestation scheme for dynamic data in-
tegrity based on data boundary integrity. Each node has a unique seed, which is erased
after initialization, that is used to insert data guards, similar to canary words [Cowan
et al. 1998], around data objects. When challenged by a verifier the prover sends a
response based on the values of all data guards. Therefore, if an adversary overwrites
a data guard, by performing a buffer overflow attack, for example, it will not be able
to recover the original data guard value since it no longer has the seed. However, this
scheme also has its own limitations. Firstly, the method is vulnerable to attacks that
do not modify data guards. Secondly, it only provides a coarse-grained data protection
where each memory block is treated as a unique object. Consequently, the scheme does
not protect individual array elements.
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Other approaches such as [Park and Shin 2005] and [Perito and Tsudik 2010] over-
write all contents of the data memory, erasing any malicious data in the process.
3.7.1. Discussion.
Approaches that do not verify the data memory are inherently vulnerable to ROP at-
tacks. However, existing approaches that verify the data memory are not completely
safe either. Due to the difficulty to predict the behaviour of dynamic data, existing ap-
proaches only partially cover the data memory. While erasing all the data memory is
the safer approach, it is not really attesting the memory contents. Furthermore, to-
gether with any malicious data, these approaches also eliminate all data a node has
worked to achieve prior to attestation.
3.8. Interaction Pattern
Most existing approaches interact in a one-to-one pattern, as depicted in Figure 1,
where for each attestation round there is one verifier and one prover. However, this is
not the only possible way to perform attestation.
For example, [Jin et al. 2010] proposes an Unpredictable Software-based Attesta-
tion Solution (USAS) to detect compromised nodes in mobile WSNs that uses a one-
to-many interaction pattern by creating dynamic attestation chains. Each chain com-
prises a single Initiator (I-node) and several Follower nodes (F-nodes). In each attes-
tation round the base station, acting as the verifier, challenges a randomly selected
I-node. The challenge consists of a random number, which is used as input for the at-
testation routine, and authentication messages for the I-node and the F-nodes. When
challenged, the I-node runs the attestation routine and uses its output to challenge
the F-nodes, which then execute the attestation routine and send the result back to
the base station. Prior to the network deployment, each node has its program memory
filled with pseudo-random noise and the base station keeps a copy of the seeds used
for all nodes. The base station then compares the results from the F-nodes with the
expected ones to detect compromised nodes. As long as one F-node result is valid the
I-node can be considered genuine as well. However, if all F-nodes return invalid re-
sults, nothing can be said about all attested nodes. In this case, either all F-nodes have
been compromised, or the I-node has been. Performing all attestation chain, which is
not a cheap operation, and not being able to affirm anything is a significant limitation
of this scheme. Another limitation of this proposal is that, even though it creates an
attestation chain, it attests only sensors that can directly communicate with the base
station to avoid intermediate nodes tampering with the messages.
Another possibility is to orchestrate a distributed attestation, in a many-to-one inter-
action pattern, where the neighbors of a node work together to attest it. For example,
[Yang et al. 2007] presents two distributed software-based attestation schemes where
sensor nodes collaborate with each other to attest the integrity of their neighbors. The
main difference from previous approaches is that only regular nodes are involved, and
this approach does not require trusted verifiers. The authors propose to fill the empty
spaces in each sensor’s program memory with pseudo-random numbers, but differently
from [Choi et al. 2007], this is done prior to node deployment. For each node, a differ-
ent seed is used for generating the pseudo-random numbers. After deployment, every
sensor discovers and establishes a pairwise key with each of its neighbors — again,
cryptographic keys are used with no protection. In the first proposed scheme, a node
splits its seed into multiple shares, sends a separate share to each neighbor, and then
deletes the seed from memory. An attestation is triggered when more than half of a
node’s neighbors detect its abnormal behavior. In this case, all neighbors elect a clus-
ter head, which is different for each attestation round. The cluster head challenges the
node, with a random number, and collects the seed shares from other neighbors to re-
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cover the seed. Then it locally computes the expected result and compares it with the
response from the challenged node. The authors propose a new method to randomly
traverse the program memory: instead of reading one memory word at a time, as was
done in SWATT, they read a block of memory addresses and perform xor operations
within blocks at each iteration. By using an appropriate block size, they are able to
reduce the total amount of iterations while still covering the whole memory. In the
second scheme, every node is also preloaded with tuples of challenge and response to
its own Mp. Instead of sending shares of the seed, a node sends a tuple to each of its
neighbors and then deletes all the tuples. When attestation is triggered, each neigh-
bor attests the node sequentially using the challenge and response from the received
tuple. A node is considered to be compromised if it does not pass the majority of at-
testations. A limitation of these approaches is that they require a minimum network
density to work. If a node does not have enough neighbors, then it cannot be properly
attested. Furthermore, both schemes incur considerable communication overhead. The
first is more vulnerable to compromised nodes as they can send forged shares of the
seed, or even worse, be elected cluster head. In the second scheme, an adversary would
have to compromise more than half of neighboring nodes to succeed. However, this lat-
ter scheme requires the prover to execute the attestation routine once for each of its
neighbors, which is both time and energy consuming.
3.8.1. Discussion.
Simplicity is the main advantage of the one-to-one interaction pattern. It allows the
verifier to target each node of the network individually. However, if several nodes need
to be attested, the overall time increases linearly with the number of nodes. Attest-
ing nodes in a one-to-many pattern reduces the overall computation time by allowing
multiple nodes to execute the attestation routine in parallel. However, if an attesta-
tion chain is used, as in [Jin et al. 2010; Asokan et al. 2015], a compromised node may
discredit the entire chain. An important characteristic of both one-to-one and one-to-
many approaches is that the verifier must be a trusted entity. This has significant
implications because some proposed attestation mechanisms require the prover to be
in the verifier’s communication range. Therefore, a mobile verifier or multiple verifiers
scattered across the network are necessary. Moreover, a verifier becomes a single point
of failure, if only a single one exists. The main feature of the many-to-one pattern is
that it can be performed without the use of trusted verifiers. This has both advantages
and disadvantages. The upside is that it allows several nodes to be attested at the
same time in a distributed manner without having a single point of failure. Besides,
it closes the gap between detection of misbehaviour and attestation, since neighboring
nodes are the direct observers of a compromised node. The downside is that it requires
a minimum network density and is more vulnerable to compromised nodes as they can
not only attempt to avoid detection but can also mislead the outcome of other nodes’
attestation.
3.9. Overview
Having examined all characteristics and their instances, one can realize that there
is no definitive attestation mechanism. Each approach has its own advantages and
disadvantages. Choosing the best solution for a specific scenario depends on a series of
factors, such as the assumptions made about the adversary, the environment in which
the nodes are going to be deployed, how the sensors are going to be placed across it,
and the underlying nodes hardware. Nevertheless, the discussion held in this Section
helps to clarify the tradeoffs between different techniques and can serve as a guideline
to developers and engineers to find the techniques that best suits their needs.
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Table 3.9 maps, in chronological order, a representative number of attestation mech-
anisms to the taxonomy illustrated in Figure 3. To the best of our knowledge, there are
no existing mechanisms that would not fit on the proposed taxonomy. Furthermore, we
believe our taxonomy still holds outside the WSNs scenario. One important note is that
we classify the mechanisms as they are first described in their original papers, without
considering proposed extensions. To better visualise the influence of the mechanisms
among themselves, we have plotted a citation graph, depicted in Figure 4. Vertices
represent attestation mechanism papers while edges represent citations. An edge from
vertex A to vertex B indicates that paper A cites paper B. Inside each vertex there are
two numbers: the number of citations it has received, and the number of citations it
has done. The main observation that we make is that even after compression and ROP
attacks have been demonstrated [Castelluccia et al. 2009] new static approaches were
proposed [Jin et al. 2010; Vetter and Westhoff 2012; Kiyomoto and Miyake 2014; Tan
et al. 2015; Yang et al. 2015; Asokan et al. 2015; Ibrahim et al. 2016] that completely
ignored or did not provide sufficient protection against such attacks. We believe that
an attestation mechanism should reflect the actual running system, and not just some
static part of the prover’s memory.
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4. OPEN RESEARCH PROBLEMS
Existing attestation mechanisms are far from perfect, with much room for improve-
ment. In this Section, we examine open research problems and give directions on how
to undertake them. We focus on four main topics, which we believe are of great impor-
tance and can receive further attention.
4.1. Overoptimistic Assumptions
Problems do not cease to exist just because they were assumed not to occur. In
many proposed attestation mechanisms there is a gap between the assumptions
made and the adversary capabilities. Therefore, several existing approaches rely on
strong premises that may not hold. For instance, SWATT [Seshadri et al. 2004] and
SCUBA [Seshadri et al. 2006] rely on strict timing of the attestation routine execu-
tion. Nevertheless, as the authors themselves recognize, proving run-time optimality
is still an open problem.
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Other approaches assume that filling the empty spaces of a prover’s program mem-
ory leaves the adversary with no space to store its malicious code without being de-
tected. Yet, only two of these approaches [Perito and Tsudik 2010; Vetter and Westhoff
2012] are capable of defending against code compression attacks; and they have their
own limitations. [Perito and Tsudik 2010] requires all the prover’s writable memo-
ries to be overwritten while [Vetter and Westhoff 2012] requires a dedicated microcon-
troller.
Another type of attack that most approaches assume does not happen or impose
restrictions to their occurrence are collusion attacks. Although it is possible to imagine
solutions to these attacks, such as jamming the prover or having its neighbors monitor
its communication during attestation, the feasibility, effectiveness, and impact of these
solutions have not been analysed.
Several software-based proposals assume a secure and authentic communication
channel between prover and verifier through the use of cryptographic keys defined
prior to network deployment. However, the nodes used in these approaches do not
have the necessary hardware to protect these keys; and, oddly enough, the absence of
such hardware is the very motivation behind their development. Cryptographic keys
can, however, be used on commodity sensor nodes when determined at run-time. For
example, Software Attestation for Key Establishment (SAKE) [Seshadri et al. 2008]
is a protocol for establishing shared keys between two neighbouring nodes without
assuming prior authentic or secret information. However, SAKE is based on ICE, the
same primitive used by SCUBA, which relies on strict time measurements. One alter-
native solution to authenticate sensor nodes is the use of Radio Frequency fingerprint
techniques which enable the identification of individual devices by the unique char-
acteristics of their radio transmitter [Ureten and Serinken 2007; Rehman et al. 2014;
Knox and Kunz 2015].
The vast majority of attestation mechanisms do not pay much attention to the
prover’s security. They are developed under the assumption that the verifier can al-
ways be trusted. However, an adversary can take advantage of this and impersonate
the verifier to perform DoS attacks targeting honest devices. [Brasser et al. 2016] in-
vestigates attacks and countermeasures under this context. They describe three at-
tacks an adversary may explore: replay, reorder and delay of attestation challenges.
The countermeasures involve the use of a secret key for authenticating the verifier
and the use of either a challenge counter or timestamp (which requires a synchronized
clock between prover and verifier), all of which need hardware protection.
While it is impractical for an adversary to launch a large scale attack that requires
physical access to compromise a sensor node, it may be enough for an adversary to
compromise just a few selected nodes in this manner. Nevertheless, the vast majority
of software-based and hybrid approaches do not take into account physical attacks. As
an alternative, [Ibrahim et al. 2016] proposed Device Attestation Resilient to Physical
Attacks (DARPA). Assuming that to perform a physical attack an adversary has to
capture and temporarily disable the target sensor for a perceptible amount of time;
DARPA requires all nodes to periodically broadcast a message that serves to prove the
node is active. All nodes log these messages which can then be collected by the verifier
during attestation. While the scheme may suffer from false positives because of device
or network failures, it is a first step towards detecting physical attacks.
4.2. Effectiveness
WSNs are usually constituted of resource constrained nodes that have limited energy,
low processing power, and little storage space. In many application scenarios, the net-
work needs to operate unattended for long periods of time, so battery depletion is cru-
cial. So whilst ensuring the integrity of the sensor network is important, it is equally
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important that security mechanisms should not have a high impact on the system per-
formance. Attestation procedures typically degrade both network throughput and the
node’s battery lifetime. Furthermore, attestation only allows to ascertain the state of
the prover at a particular point in time. How often should then attestation be per-
formed to provide assurance of the network’s integrity whilst not depleting resources?
[Chen et al. 2010] presents a model to analyse the frequency with which code at-
testation should be performed to maximize sensors lifetime while effectively detecting
compromised nodes. However, their model considers solely designs in which attesta-
tion is invoked probabilistically and ignores aspects such as using network monitoring
information to decide when to trigger attestation next. Their model leads then to the
rather straightforward conclusion that the frequency at which attestation must be per-
formed depends directly on the rate at which nodes can be compromised (compromise
rate). In practice, the compromise rate is unknown a prior and is highly dependent on
many different factors such as the network deployment, types of attack, and value and
timeliness of the information sensed by the network. For example, it has been shown
that malicious packets can propagate quickly and compromise entire networks in short
periods of time [Gu and Noorani 2008; Yang et al. 2008]. However, in their analysis,
Chen et al. ignore such aspects and assume a compromise rate in the range of 0.0058
to 0.0072 nodes per hour, corresponding to a node being compromised once every five
to eight days.
Further analysis is needed to determine not only when to perform attestation, but
also which devices to attest and what to do when a compromised node is detected. For
example, nodes closer to the base station may have a higher value as targets since they
also forward much of the data from peripheral nodes to the base station and vice-versa.
Such aspects should be taken into account, e.g., through different weights, when de-
ciding which nodes to attest. Furthermore, a compromised node can easily broadcast
malicious packets to its neighbors. So attesting the neighbours of a compromised sen-
sor would be an effective way of reducing the adversary compromise rate and limit
diffusion.
4.3. Time of Check to Time of Use
Perhaps the biggest issue when using attestation in WSN is the gap between the Time
of Check to Time of Use (TOCTOU) [Bratus et al. 2008]. Attesting a node occurs at a
particular point in time and does not guarantee that the node has not been temporarily
compromised before, or that it will not be compromised right after attestation. An ad-
versary can perform a TOCTOU attack as long as it has some unmeasured location to
hide its malicious data before attestation starts and is able to reinstall it after attesta-
tion ends [Kovah et al. 2012]. In fact, [Castelluccia et al. 2009] presents a rootkit-based
attack that does exactly this. The difficulty arises from attesting all the memories of
a prover. Some dynamic attestation approaches [Kil et al. 2009; Zhang and Liu 2010]
try to close the TOCTOU gap by checking run-time properties of the software execu-
tion. However, it is not always possible to predict the behaviour of dynamic data, and
these approaches end up covering only a subset of the required properties. ICE [Se-
shadri et al. 2006] attempts to guarantee an untampered execution environment to
ensure that a piece of code runs unmodified. The limitation of this approach is that it
applies solely to self-contained code that does not invoke other software on the prover
and executes with interrupts disabled. Another approach to reduce the TOCTOU gap
could be the integration of attestation and Control Flow Integrity (CFI) [Abadi et al.
2005] techniques. Protecting the control flow of a program prevents adversaries from
arbitrarily altering its execution. CFI techniques achieve this protection by embedding
control code in the original application program. Attesting that both control and ap-
plication code have not been altered is a further indication that the original program
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is being executed as it was supposed to. [Ferguson and Gu 2011] implements control
flow protection in the context of WSNs; however, the described scheme has not been
combined with any attestation mechanism. Control-Flow ATtestation (C-FLAT) [Abera
et al. 2016] is a similar, but different, approach. Instead of embedding code to protect
the authentic application flow, it embeds code to monitor its execution path. This al-
lows the verifier to attest the prover’s run-time behaviour, detecting any control flow
diversion. Nonetheless, it is important to note, that CFI is not infallible [Goktas et al.
2014] and does not ensure data flow security [Chen et al. 2005; Castro et al. 2006; Hu
et al. 2016].
Significant effort has been dedicated recently to approaches capable of defending
against ROP attacks. These broadly fall into two categories: one, is the already men-
tioned CFI, while the other is software diversification [Larsen et al. 2014]. However,
up to now, all proposed mechanisms can be subverted in some way. Therefore, ideas
continue to evolve, and new approaches continue to emerge. A promising countermea-
sure to such attacks is the use of execute-only memory [Backes et al. 2014; Crane
et al. 2015], which allows marking pieces of memory as executable but not readable.
However, in order to attest a device, the attestation routine needs to read the code it
executes, and, thus far, no approach integrates the two techniques.
4.4. Scalability
To attest a device, a verifier must know its expected internal state and hardware archi-
tecture. In a simple WSN scenario, all the nodes may be executing the same applica-
tion on the same hardware platform, making this reasonably easy. However, in many
other situations, the network is typically heterogeneous and comprises different types
of sensors, or different cluster nodes execute different applications. In more extreme
cases, the network may contain many sensors from distinct vendors executing several
different applications. How can one then store and manage the information necessary
to attest these devices in a scalable manner? The approach proposed in [Park and Shin
2005] partitions the application code into multiple blocks, calculates a digest for each
block and classifies the block according to whether it belongs to all, a group, or a unique
node. Although this method allows to significantly reduce the amount of information
needed, it also has its own security vulnerabilities. For instance, an adversary may
compute the prover’s digests before modifying its memory and then only keep a copy
of the digests to pass attestation. Another approach is to have similar devices, which
execute the same application, attesting each other in a distributed fashion. However,
to be viable, this approach requires a minimum density of similar devices scattered
across the network.
Software updates further complicate the issue. The slightest change in the software
a prover executes can impact the attestation outcome. So additional information needs
to be maintained to know which devices are running which versions. [Sadeghi and
Stu¨ble 2004] proposes to attest a device based on the properties that it offers instead
of its software and hardware components. However, in most scenarios, property-based
attestation requires the use of a trusted third party to map the device’s components
to properties [Chen et al. 2008]. Moreover, the identification and formal definition of
security properties are still open problems [Nagarajan et al. 2009].
A more recent approach, named Scalable Embedded Device Attesta-
tion (SEDA) [Asokan et al. 2015], was designed with the main goal of attesting
a large amount of devices. The most remarkable aspect of SEDA is that the verifier
does not need to know the detailed configuration of all provers. However, to achieve
this, the approach relies on cryptographic secrets that must be secured by hardware.
With these secrets, the nodes can be issued a certificate of its valid software configura-
tion, during initialization or after an update, and can share the certificate with their
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neighbors. Attestation is performed in a one-to-many interaction pattern, where each
device attests its neighbors and reports back to its parent. As stated in Section 3.8,
the main limitation of this interaction pattern is that a compromised node invalidates
the results for all the nodes following it on the attestation chain. In the worst case
scenario, the first node in the chain has been compromised, and resources used to
perform attestation are discarded. Another limitation of this approach is that it only
provides a static integrity measurement.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Attestation is a critical service that enables the detection of compromised devices.
However, there is no consensus on how to perform attestation in an effective and secure
manner. Consequently, several mechanisms have been proposed over the last years.
They differ not only in design choices and implementation but also in the assumptions
they make over the system and adversary models. As we have shown in this paper,
some assumptions are more realistic than others in the context of WSNs, and not all
proposals can be considered secure. Furthermore, we presented a taxonomy that iden-
tifies the main characteristics of proposed solutions and surveyed the state of the art
mapping existing approaches to our taxonomy. This allowed us to discuss the tradeoffs
between design choices made by different proposals. Finally, we have identified open
research issues and given directions on how to tackle them.
Although we have centered the discussion around WSNs, we believe our taxonomy
is still relevant outside this context. Moreover, all the analysis of advantages and dis-
advantages of different techniques done in this paper can be directly applied to the
Internet of Things scenario, since it shares many characteristics in common with sen-
sor networks. We hope this work serves both as a reference to avoid already committed
mistakes and as a guide to future attestation mechanisms.
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